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THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL
DEBTS
Margaret M. Mahoney*
I. INTRODUCTION
The settlement of a couple's financial affairs at the time of divorce often
requires the resolution of debt issues between them. Specifically, responsibility
must be allocated between former spouses for repayment of their outstanding
debts. This article analyzes the laws in common law property states that govern
the judicial authority to reallocate responsibility for the repayment of individual
and joint debts at the time of divorce.
In the large majority of states that employ a common law marital
property system, spouses retain their "separate" identity during marriage under
the rules defining both liability for debts and ownership of assets.' Thus, legal
responsibility for the repayment of debts during marriage is assigned primarily
by contract law principles.2 If one partner individually "signed for" a loan, he or
she is obligated to repay it; if both spouses incurred a joint obligation, then both
are liable for repayment. In the case of secured loans, such as real estate
mortgages, the creditor also has recourse to the property. The same model of
marriage, which regards the spouses as individual actors, also shapes the rules of
4
property ownership during marriage in common law property states. As a
general rule, each spouse retains full ownership of the assets that he or she
acquires; there is no co-ownership resulting from the marital status.
At the time of divorce, however, modem equitable distribution laws
authorize the courts to reallocate both assets and debts between the spouses.
When first introduced in the 1970s and 1980s, most state equitable distribution
statutes focused on the judicial distribution of assets owned by the divorcing
couple and ignored the related topic of debts.6 These laws addressed two key
issues: first, what assets are subject to the court's equitable authority and, second,
by what standard is the allocation to be made in individual cases. Over the past
few decades, legislatures and courts in the common law property states have

Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. The author would like to thank law librarian
Susanna M. Leers and law students Emily Guzan and Christine Long, who provided valuable
research assistance, and members of the Law School Document Technology Center, who provided
technical support for this project.
1 See HARRY D. KRAUSE & DAVID D. MEYER, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL § 8.6, at 97-98 (5th ed.
2007) (describing the common law marital property system). A different set of rules governs both
ownership of assets and responsibility for debts in marriage in the nine community property states.
See id. § 8.8, at 99-101. The two distinct marital property regimes are discussed at greater length
infra text accompanying notes 21-31.
2 See KRAUSE & MEYER, supra note 1, § 8.6.
3 See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 22.01 (2d ed. 2007).
4 See KRAUSE & MEYER, supra note 1, § 8.6.
5 See JOHN W. SINGER, PROPERTY § 9.3.1, at 394-95 (3d ed. 2010).
6 See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 46-47 (1985) (reviewing the enactment of
state equitable distribution statutes); see also infra note 29 (collecting statutes in the common law
property states that refer to debt distribution).
*
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provided relatively clear answers to these questions, although not in a uniform
manner. 7
Within this evolving framework of judicial authority over their finances,
divorcing couples inevitably raised questions about the post-divorce status of
their liabilities. The subsequent development of rules governing debt allocation
occurred primarily in the state courts rather than the legislatures. Notably, in its
recent project titled Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution ("the
Principles"), the American Law Institute included rules to address the key issues
that arise regarding debt allocation in divorce proceedings. These include the
threshold question of judicial power over debts, limitations on the types of debts
subject to allocation, and the standard to be employed by courts in dividing debts
between spouses in individual cases. 9
This Article explores the rules governing debt allocation in the common
law property states and under the Principles as well as the ways they deviate
from corresponding rules governing the distribution of assets in divorce
proceedings. Most often, when the debt rules deviate from corresponding
property rules, the variation results in less judicial authority to "reassign"
responsibility for debts from one spouse to the other, when compared to the
courts' authority over assets.
Major differences between the treatment of assets and debts appear in
several important areas of equitable distribution law. First, equitable distribution
statutes in the large majority of common law property states do not expressly
create any judicial authority to reallocate responsibility between spouses for the
repayment of debts. In the absence of such statutory authority, certain
jurisdictions have been reluctant to require their trial courts to allocate debts.'o
Next, in some states the characterization rules, which identify debts subject to
distribution, contain a significant exclusion for outstanding debts not that were
incurred for a "joint purpose."" There is no corresponding limitation placed on
assets subject to equitable distribution. An additional difference in the
characterization of assets and debts subject to distribution appears in the
Principles,where the category of premarital assets is gradually recharacterized in
long-term marriages to become assets subject to distribution,12 but no similar
recharacterization is proposed for premarital debts.13 Finally, the legal standards
employed by the courts to determine the share of outstanding liability allocated to
each spouse at the time of divorce may differ from the corresponding asset

See JOHN DE WiTT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW §§ 10.03, 10.10 (3d ed. 2005)
[hereinafter GREGORY ET AL., FAMILY LAW].
8 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002).

9

See id. § 4.09.
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 43-59.

1o

1"See discussion
1
1

infra Part V.C.

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.12, at 769-84.
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 78-82.
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allocation standards. For example, in a provision titled "Excess Debt,"' 4 the
Principles authorize judicial waiver of the fifty-fifty distribution rule, generally
applicable to both assets and debts, in cases where debts exceed assets. 5
An economic partnership model of marriage provides the theoretical
basis for the equitable distribution doctrines applied in divorce proceedings' 6 and
replaces the view of spouses as separate legal actors, which prevails during
marriage. After thirty-plus years of experience with the equitable distribution
doctrine in the common law states, the distribution of assets produced by this
theoretical shift is a familiar and generally accepted aspect of divorce. However,
as revealed by the discussion that follows, the partnership model has not been as
readily accepted or invoked by rulemakers in common law property states when
the subject matter is liabilities of the parties rather than their assets.
Unfortunately, the state courts announcing debt allocation rules and the
drafters of the Principles have failed to explain their reluctance to include debt
allocation as fully as asset allocation within the financial accounting required in
In speculating about this matter, a likely
modem divorce proceedings.
explanation for the substantial differences between the treatment of assets and
debts involves basic attitudes in society about being in debt as well as the
practical consequences for individuals of carrying debt burdens.
Consider the following pair of scenarios. In the first, in a common law
property state, one spouse during marriage owns assets worth $50,000, the other
partner owns no assets, and neither spouse has debts. In a divorce proceeding,
the equitable distribution of assets will likely result in the first partner losing part
of his/her assets, which will be ultimately transferred to the other. For example,
in a state with a fifty-fifty distribution rule, the first spouse would lose, and the
second spouse gain, $25,000. In a state without a fifty-fifty rule, the distribution
amount would be discretionary with the court; the propertied spouse could lose,
and the other gain, either more than or less than $25,000.
In the second scenario, neither spouse has assets of significant value, the
first partner has no debt, and the other has incurred $50,000 of debt during the
marriage. At the time of divorce, under the equitable distribution process
described in the first scenario, the first spouse would be required to assume
responsibility for a portion of the partner's outstanding debt. The portion would
be $25,000 of debt in a fifty-fifty jurisdiction, or a varying amount if the state has
a discretionary standard for fixing equitable shares.
In both scenarios, the first partner in a fifty-fifty jurisdiction will become
$25,000 poorer following divorce-a reduction in wealth from $50,000 to
$25,000, or a reduction from $0 to minus $25,000. These results follow because
the notion of individual financial autonomy, which governed during marriage
under common law principles, would have been replaced by the partnership

14See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note
1 See discussion infratext accompanying notes 133-35.
1 See GREGORY ET AL., FAMILY LAW, supra note 7, §§ 3.08, 10.02.

8, §4.09(c), at 735-36.
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principle at the time of divorce. From the perspective of the first partner who
suffers the loss in both scenarios, and perhaps for the judge announcing these
results as well, the negative economic impact in the second scenario may seem
more harsh or even unfair.17
In spite of the widespread reliance upon credit by individuals and
institutions in our society, the status of being "in debt" often has negative
connotations, especially for the person who is unable to meet his or her financial
Now, at a time when the national economy is unsound in many
obligations.
basic respects, the prospect of overwhelming personal debt is an unwelcome
reality for many individuals and a horrible prospect for many others.'9 Many
individuals with unmanageable debt have been forced to make life-changing
decisions, such as abandoning educational dreams or selling their homes.2 0
Within this attitudinal and practical framework, the prospect of assuming

17 See generally Jeffrey Dew, Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Differing Roles of Assets and
Consumer Debt in Marriage, 28 J. FAM. & EcoN. ISSUES 89, 92 (2007) (describing how "[a]ssets
and debts may carry fundamentally different meanings for married couples," involving social
norms as well as practical significance).
18 See generally LENDOL G. CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
CONSUMER CREDIT 74 (1999) ("Debt is an economic concept. It is also a moral state."); David
Leonhardt, Once Again Debt Is Miscast as the Villain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at Cl
("Americans have a very strange relationship with debt. We seem to take on more of it than any
other society ever has, but, boy, do we like to beat ourselves up about it.").
1 In recent years, especially the years leading up to the current economic recession, studies
revealed a reduction in the net wealth of many United States households resulting from several
factors, including increased debt. See, e.g., Niall Ferguson, Reasons to Worry, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 2006, at 48 (setting out data regarding household income, savings, and debt accumulation
during this period); David Lawder, Household Wealth Down for Second Quarter in Row, REUTERS
UK ED., June 5, 2008, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN0537133020080605
(reporting information provided by the Federal Reserve for the first half of 2008). The impact of
the recession on debt creation has been negative: "Total household credit has contracted for seven
straight quarters" as of summer 2010. Roger Lowenstein, The Way We Live Now: Paralyzedby
at
available
15,
at
2010,
16,
July
MAG.,
TIMES
N.Y.
Debt,
http://www.nytimes.con/2010/07/18/magazine/18FOB-wwln-t.html. There is a body of literature,
appearing in both the popular media and academic journals, addressing the question whether lack
of financial resources in a marriage, including lots of debt, contribute to couples' decisions to
divorce. There is no apparent consensus on this issue. See, e.g., Paul R. Amato & Denise Previti,
People's Reasonsfor Divorcing: Gender, Social Class, the Life Course, and Adjustment, 24 J.FAM.
ISSUES 602, 605-06 (2003); Liz P. Weston, Money Isn't the Culpritin Most Divorces, MSNMONEY,
June 6, 2008, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com. Ironically, individuals and divorce attorneys
report that the current economic downturn has caused couples in some cases to postpone divorce
and perhaps continue to share a residence, for economic reasons. See Jennifer Levitz, What God
Has Joined Together, Recession Makes Hard to Put Asunder, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2009, at Al.
20 See generally Dew, supra note 17, at 93 ("In general, consumer debt may represent a loss of
choice. One's financial future becomes written when large amounts of consumer debt are
assumed."). Additional life-altering effects arising from unmanageable debt have been reported
during these recessionary times. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Aspiring Lawyer Finds Debt Is
Bigger Hurdle than Bar Exam, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 2009, at Al (describing a recent law graduate
who "was refused entry to the New York bar by a group of judges because of $400,000 in student
debt").
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responsibility for debts incurred by the other spouse prior to divorce may well
seem more onerous than the prospect of losing a portion of one's assets in a
divorce settlement.
The public perception and practical consequences of being in debt,
described here, may well have shaped the doctrines governing debt distribution at
the time of divorce in common law property states. The discussion that follows
explores how a general aversion to shifting debt may be the unspoken rationale
for particular debt allocation rules. The discussion also evaluates existing rules
in light of the general goals of equitable distribution law in the common law
property states, highlighting financial fairness under the partnership model of
marriage applied at the time of relationship dissolution.
II. MARITAL PROPERTY LAW
The rules governing the ownership of property and responsibility for debt
during marriage are an important backdrop to understanding debt allocation at
the time of divorce. In an intact marriage, both the property rights and debt
liability of each spouse vary greatly depending upon whether the couple resides
in a common law (separate) property state or a community property
jurisdiction.2 1
In the nine community property states, as a general rule, each spouse
owns one-half of the assets acquired by either or both during marriage. These
assets become the so-called "community assets."22 Community assets may be
available to creditors to satisfy the "community debts" incurred during marriage
by one or both spouses.23
By way of contrast, in the forty-one common law property states, the
assets acquired and debts incurred by one partner remain his or her separate
property and debt during the marriage.24 In the separate property states,

§ 4.06 cmt. b, at 691; Carolyn
J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 CoLuM. L. REV. 75, 124 (2004) ("There
are two major regimes of marital property governance in the United States .... .").
22 See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES ch. 1 (7th ed. 2009). A major exception to the definition of community assets set out in the
text is created for gifts received by either spouse from third parties during marriage. See JOHN DE
Wirr GREGORY ET AL., PROPERTY DIvISION INDIVORCE PROCEEDINGS: A FIFTY STATE GUIDE § 1.03,
at 1-6 (2006) [hereinafter GREGORY ET AL., FIFTY STATE GUIDE].
23 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.06 cmt. b, at 691 ("Under
community-property law, the community is usually liable for the debts incurred by either spouse
during the marriage."). The definition of "community debt" varies from state to state. See
GREGORY ET AL., FIFTY STATE GUIDE, supra note 22, § 10.02, at 10-4; SINGER, supra note 5, §
9.3.2, at 400.
24 See GREGORY ET AL., FIFTY STATE GUIDE, supra note 22, § 1.02, at 1-3; Marie T. Reilly, You and
Me Against the World: Marriageand Divorce From Creditors' Perspective,in RECONCEIVING THE
FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION 195, 196 (Robin F. Wilson ed., 2006); Frantz & Dagan, supra note 21, at 124 ("In
21See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supranote 8,
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responsibility for debts is established under contract law principles limiting
liability for unsecured debts to the spouse(s) who borrowed money and promised
to repay it.2 5 If both partners incurred a debt, for example, by applying together
for a joint credit card or mortgage loan on their home, then both are responsible
as a matter of contract law to the creditor for repayment.
The commentary accompanying the Principles summarizes the two
alternative approaches to defining liability for debts in marriage as follows:
"Under community-property law, the community is usually liable for the debts
incurred by either spouse during the marriage ... . Common-law states do not
26
make both spouses presumptively liable on the debts incurred by one of them."
At the time of divorce, the equitable distribution laws in common law
property states shift from the model of separate financial ownership and debt
liability by empowering the divorce courts to make financial orders dramatically
affecting the wealth of each partner leaving the marriage. 27 The underlying
principle of equitable distribution is that the sharing of financial benefits and
responsibilities of the marriage partnership is necessary in many cases to achieve
a fair final result when the relationship terminates. The power to reallocate the
ownership of assets between spouses, based on this principle, was established in
many jurisdictions by statute in the 1970s and '80s.2 The topic addressed herein
is the related power of the divorce courts to reorder the responsibility of
divorcing spouses for the repayment of their outstanding debts.
Equitable distribution statutes in the large majority of common law
29
Many state statutes
property states are silent as to this important matter.
equitable division states, title theory still governs property questions during an intact marriage...
An exception to this general principle arises under the common law doctrine of necessaries and
the related family expense statutes enacted in some states, which extend debt liability to the noncontracting spouse for items purchased for family support. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN F.
APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 230-32 (4th ed. 2010); Reilly, supra
24, at 200-01.
note
26
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.06 cmt. b, at 691.
27 This article does not address the issue of asset and debt allocation at the time of divorce in
community property states.
28 See WEITZMAN, supra note 6, at 46-49 (reviewing the enactment of state equitable distribution
statutes).
29 The following equitable distribution statutes, appearing in the divorce codes of common law
property states, expressly authorize debt distribution: D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910(b) (LexisNexis
1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(1), (5) (West 2006); HAW. REv. STAT. § 580-47(a)(4) (West
2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330(1) (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24(1) (2004); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-3-620 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(C) (2008). The statutes in Delaware
and North Carolina refer to debt distribution in provisions authorizing interim orders. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 507 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(i.1) (2009). Debt distribution provisions
are more common in the divorce codes of community property states. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §
25-318 (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2622 (West 2004); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801(4)(b) (2009);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (West 2005). Section
4.09(1) of the Principles establishes judicial authority to reallocate debts, providing that "marital
property and marital debts are divided at dissolution so that the spouses receive net shares equal in
value. . . ." PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supranote 8, § 4.09(1); see also id. §
25
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acknowledge the existence of spousal debt by including the obligations of each
partner as a factor to be considered when the court allocates their assets.o But
the consideration of debts in this manner has a very different effect, both in
theory and result, than a rule requiring the trial court to include the reallocation
of debts in the equitable distribution of marital wealth. In the absence of this
broader equitable authority over debts, each spouse is left with the same debts
that he or she owed during marriage under the rule of separate liability discussed
earlier.
In the face of equitable distribution statutes that fail to address debt
distribution, the courts in many states have assumed authority to allocate debts at
divorce as a necessary tool for achieving the fair economic results envisioned by
equitable distribution principles. The next section discusses the journey taken to
establishing this judicial authority in various states and the ways in which judicial
power has often been defined in a more limited fashion when the subject matter
is debts rather than assets. 3 1
III. JURISDICTION TO ALLOCATE DEBTS
In the case of many divorcing couples, a fair resolution of their financial
affairs requires judicial reallocation of both assets and outstanding debts. In
response to this need, the courts in many jurisdictions without debt distribution
statutes have established judicial authority over debts in divorce cases.32
Notably, however, not all state courts reached this same result upon first
considering their powers regarding debts. For example, a trial court in Arizona, a
community property state, ruled that "it was without jurisdiction to make an
allocation of indebtedness" under the state's recently enacted equitable
distribution law.33 On appeal, however, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed
this ruling.34
4.09 cmt. g, at 737. ("In dividing property, the court must provide for the spouses' debts as well as
their assets." (emphasis added)).
30 See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502(a)(3) (Supp. 2010) ("Factors which are relevant to the
equitable division of marital property include the following: ... [t]he age, health, station, amount
and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the
?,arties." (emphasis added)).
See generally In re Scoffield, 852 P.2d 664, 667 (Mont. 1993) ("In the debt oriented society now
prevailing, the term 'marital debts' is found in nearly every dissolution case filed. The term is
found in the pleadings, separation agreements, court orders and judgments, and in the appellate
court decisions. Yet, the term 'marital debt' never appears in the [state equitable distribution
statute] and certainly is never defined." (quoting In re Marriage of Welch, 795 S.W.2d 640, 642
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990)).
32 See GREGORY ET AL., FIFrY STATE GUIDE, supra note 22, § 10.03[B][1], at 10-22 n.141
(collecting cases from common law states where courts assumed authority to allocate debts at
divorce in the absence of authorizing statutes).
" Cadwell v. Cadwell, 616 P.2d 920, 921 (Ariz.1980) (quoting the trial court).
34 Id. at 921-22 (requiring the trial court to consider on remand the husband's request that
community liabilities resulting from the wife's embezzlement from a third party be assigned to her
for repayment because "[a]ssets and obligations are reciprocally related and there can be no
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One analytical approach to assuming jurisdiction over debts involves
construction of statutory language. For example, the Connecticut
judicial
broad
equitable distribution statute construed by the state supreme court in Schmidt v.
Schmid?5 provided that divorce courts "may assign to either the husband or wife
all or any part of the estate of the other."3 While acknowledging that "there is
no express provision .

.

. authorizing a court to order that sole liability of the

debts of the parties be imposed upon one of the parties,"37 the state high court
ruled that "the 'estate' of the parties, as referred to in the statute comprehends the
aggregate of the property and liabilities of each."38 As a result, the trial court's
action assigning joint obligations to the husband for repayment was affirmed on
appeal in Schmidt.
Courts in other states have established their authority over debts without
reference to particular statutory language by relying upon the general goal of
financial fairness under the equitable distribution law. For example, shortly after
the enactment of the Minnesota statute, the state appellate court observed in
Filkins v. Filkins39 that "the statute does not give specific authority to apportion
debts as property"4 0 but ruled nevertheless that "[d]ebts are apportionable under
Minnesota's statute."41 According to the court, "[c]onsidering the fact that credit
is one of the primary ways that couples obtain their property, it seems only fair
that it should be apportioned in the property settlement."42 As a result, the trial
court order, which listed and allocated ten separate debts incurred by the spouses
during their marriage, was affirmed on appeal in the Filkins case.
Even when the jurisdiction to allocate debts at divorce has been clearly
established by the courts, as in the cases from Minnesota and Connecticut
discussed above, the additional question has sometimes arisen whether the
exercise of such authority is mandatory. In the absence of a statutory mandate,
the courts in some jurisdictions have ruled that trial judges retain discretion in
individual cases to disregard one party's request to allocate debts.43
complete and equitable distribution of property without a corresponding consideration and
disposition of obligations" (emphasis added)).
35 429 A.2d 470 (Conn. 1980).
36 Id. at 473 (citing the state equitable distribution statute).
37
38

id

42

id

Id. at 474; see also In re Marriage of Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 466, 467 (Iowa 1980) ("[T]he
allocation of marital debts inheres in the property division.").
3 347 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
40 Id. at 528-29.
41 Id. at 529.
Certain state statutes make it clear that exercise of the trial court's authority to allocate debts is
not a discretionary matter. See Bchara v. Bchara, 563 S.E.2d 398, 405 (Va. Ct. App. 2002)
(reversing an equitable distribution order because the trial court ignored husband's request that
certain debts be characterized and allocated under the Virginia statute, which provides that
"apportionment of marital debts . .. shall be determined by the court after consideration of [certain]
factors" (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E) (2008)) (emphasis added)); see also PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.09 cmt. g ("In dividing property, the court
must provide for the spouses' debts as well as their assets.").
43
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In Hackett v. Hackett," for example, the Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's equitable distribution order, which divided the divorcing
couple's assets but denied the husband's request to simultaneously divide their
debts.45 The marital debts in Hackett included a mortgage on the family home
and approximately thirty additional outstanding obligations.46 According to the
state high court, "the chancellor was not required by [the Arkansas equitable
distribution statute] to divide the debts, that is, to consider each debt and assign a
party to pay it."47 At the same time, the Hackett court emphasized that the trial
judge "was obligated to consider those debts in deciding the questions of
alimony, support for the children, and perhaps the division of the property"" and
remanded the case to be sure that the trial court made this analysis.49
The significance of a legislative mandate to reallocate marital debts is
illustrated by the historical development of the law in the state of Missouri. Prior
to 1998, the Missouri equitable distribution statute provided that "the court shall .
. . divide the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just," and
was silent as to debt allocation.50 A statutory amendment in 1998 inserted the
words "and marital debts" immediately after the word "property" in this
provision. 5 1 In the 1999 case of Wright v. Wright,52 the Missouri Court of
Appeals explained the impact of this amendment on the role of the courts in
divorce cases, as follows:
Under the [unamended] version of [the equitable distribution statute,] ..
. marital debts incurred during the marriage were not marital property,
and the trial court was under no obligation to divide them . . . .
[Nevertheless], our appellate courts have recognized that, in order to
effectuate a fair and equitable division of marital property, trial courts,
as a general rule, should do so. . . . Appreciating this fact, the

[legislature] recently amended [the statute] to expressly require trial
courts to divided not only marital property, but marital debt. 3

" 643 S.W.2d 560 (Ark. 1982).
Id. at 561.
" Id. at 562.
47 Id.; see also Ellis v. Ellis, 57 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001) ("Because the chancellor is
not required to allocate debt, there can be no error for allocating some but not all debt."); Levy v.
Levy, 291 S.E.2d 201, 202 (S.C. 1982) (ruling, prior to legislative amendment, that "[w]e refuse to
hold, as a matter of law, that the judge must order the sharing of debts"); Wright v. Wright, I
S.W.3d 52, 59-60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that, prior to state statutory amendment, "the trial
court was under no obligation to divide [debts]").
48 643 S.W.2d at 562. As discussed earlier, state laws governing the equitable distribution of assets
generally impose the requirement that divorce courts must consider the parties' liabilities in
dividing assets between them. See supra text accompanying note 30.
45

49 643 S.W.2d at 563.

so See the historical and statutory notes following Mo. ANN.

STAT.

§ 452.330 (West 2003).

s' See id.

" 1 S.W.3d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). Due to the timing of the case, the statutory amendment
described in the text was not applied in Wright.
5 Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added).
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As in Missouri, an amendment of the South Carolina equitable
distribution statute moved the state supreme court to require, for the first time,
debt allocation in divorce proceedings. Prior to 1986, the South Carolina statute
was silent regarding debt allocation, and the state high court had "refuse[d] to
hold, as a matter of law, that the judge must order the sharing of debts as well as
the sharing of assets."54 Following the addition of statutory language regarding
debt allocation, the high court reversed this position, ruling that "[m]arital debt,
like marital property, must be specifically identified and apportioned in equitable
distribution."55
The impact of this legislative amendment was felt by the spouses in the
subsequent case of Wynn v. Wynn,- 6 where the South Carolina Court of Appeals
reversed an equitable distribution order because the trial court failed to include
the couple's joint credit card debt. The trial court had ordered a net property
distribution of fifty-five percent to the husband and forty-five percent to the wife.
The court of appeals in Wynn revised this order to include the same respective
shares of the excluded credit card obligation.57
The addition of judicial responsibility for debt allocation to the South
Carolina equitable distribution statute was accomplished in a circuitous fashion.
In 1986, the state legislature added the following italicized language to the
existing provision requiring divorce courts to consider the parties' debts in
making a fair distribution of their assets: Courts were required to consider "liens
and any other encumbrances upon the marital property, (which themselves must
be equitably divided), .

.

. and any other existing debts incurred by the parties or

either of them during the course of the marriage."5 s Thereafter, although the
highlighted language refers only to secured debts, the state appellate court ruled
that it "implicitly require[d] that [all] marital debt, like marital property, be
specifically identified and apportioned in the equitable distribution." 9 In this
roundabout manner, the legislature and courts changed the South Carolina
equitable distribution law to require trial courts to allocate debts along with assets
in divorce proceedings.
The foregoing discussion of judicial power to allocate debts at divorce
revealed significant gaps in state equitable distribution laws relating to debt
allocation. First, the discussion documented the failure of legislatures to include
debt allocation at the time of the initial enactment of state equitable distribution

Levy v. Levy, 291 S.E.2d 201, 202 (S.C. 1982).
5 Wooten v. Wooten, 615 S.E.2d 98, 105 (S.C. 2005).
56 600 S.E.2d 71 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
" Id. at 75.
ss S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-620 (2009) (emphasis added).
' Frank v. Frank, 429 S.E.2d 823, 826 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993); see also Hardy v. Hardy, 429 S.E.2d
811, 814 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing trial court order "which require[d] each spouse to satisfy
the debts which were in his or her name," and remanding the case for an equitable apportionment of
all marital debts).
54
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statutes and its continuing absence from the large majority of these state laws.
The discussion further documented the judicial characterization in certain states
of debt allocation, in the absence of any legislative mandate, as a discretionary
judicial power. Each of these limitations reveals ambivalence about the role of
debts in the final accounting that must take place when a marital partnership ends
in divorce.
IV. THE IMPACT OF DEBT DISTRIBUTION ON SPOUSES AND
CREDITORS
The divorce court order reallocating responsibility for the repayment of
outstanding debts has an immediate and substantial impact on the post-divorce
financial condition of each spouse. When a joint obligation is assigned for
repayment to one divorcing spouse, his or her net worth is decreased by the full
amount of the debt, while the partner's net worth is correspondingly enhanced.
The effect is even greater in the less common case where the court assigns a debt
for which one spouse was solely responsible during marriage to the other partner
post-divorce. The newly-obligated former spouse will have to satisfy these
debts, by virtue of the divorce court's order, according to the original loan terms
with the creditor.
Furthermore, the assignment of debt responsibility to one spouse at the
time of divorce creates an obligation to the other partner. As with the other
property and support-related obligations created by divorce court orders,
remedies are available to the obligee in the event of future nonpayment by the
obligated spouse.o
Future enforcement issues between former spouses can be avoided if the
loan obligations are renegotiated with creditors at the time of divorce, with the
partner designated by the court becoming solely responsible to the creditor.
Indeed, courts have sometimes ordered the designated spouse to attempt to
refinance outstanding loans in this manner.6 ' Of course, this type of change
requires the willing participation of the creditor.62

See Margaret M. Mahoney, Debts, Divorce and Disarrayin Bankruptcy, 73 UMKC L. REv. 83,
89-90 (2004). In addition, "the divorce court can provide [anticipatory] interspousal remedies to
protect one spouse against any liability actually realized on debts allocated to the other . .. [,
including] the creation of a security interest in property allocated to the debtor spouse, in favor of
the other spouse." PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.09 illus. 4, at
741.
61 See 2 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 6:99, at 113 n.26.5 (3d ed.
Supp. 2005) (collecting cases); see also Melissa Needle, House ... Pensions... Debts: Can I Keep
It? Must We Split It?, 32 FAM. ADvoc. 22, 24 (2009) ("It may be appropriate to establish a time
frame within which the party receiving the asset is required to refinance the mortgage, car loan, or
the like so that the liability no longer remains in both names.").
62 See 2 TURNER, supra note 61, § 6:99 Supp., at 113 (noting that creditors may be amenable to
refinancing in these circumstances "if their security is not meaningfully impaired").
60
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Clearly, the court order reallocating responsibility for the repayment of
debts between divorcing spouses cannot change the rights of third-party
creditors, secured or unsecured, who are not joined as parties in the divorce
proceeding." For example, the divorce court may assign sole responsibility for
the repayment of an outstanding joint obligation to one spouse and also assign
sole responsibility to that same individual for repayment of another loan incurred
solely by the other partner. As to both of these obligations, the rights of the
creditor in a common law property state are those described in Part III above,
arising under the law of contracts and rules of marital property. Both during
marriage and following the divorce, the creditor is entitled to collect the first
(joint) loan from either spouse and the second loan exclusively from the
individual who incurred it. In the event that the former spouse to whom the
divorce court assigned the loans defaults, the creditors can still pursue the other
partner.
A statute in Arizona, a community property state, requires the court to
inform divorcing parties about their continuing responsibilities to creditors under
these principles. Thus, the state dissolution statute requires the following notice
to both spouses:
In your property settlement or decree of dissolution[,] ... the court may
assign responsibility for certain community debts to one spouse or the
other. Please be aware that a court order that does this is binding on the
spouses only and does not necessarily relieve either of you from your
responsibility for these community debts.65
This result as to third-party creditors is required by basic contract law and
fairness principles.
V. WHAT DEBTS ARE SUBJECT TO ALLOCATION
Once the judicial authority to allocate responsibility for debts between
divorcing spouses is established, additional rules must identify the types of debts
subject to reallocation and the standard to be employed by the courts in making
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801(4)(c) (2009) ("As between the spouses, the allocation of a
liability to a spouse obligates that spouse to extinguish that liability. The allocation in no way
affects the rights of creditors."); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DissoLuTioN, supra note 8, §
4.09 illus. 4, at 741 ("[The divorce court] is often unable to bind creditors to any allocation of the
debt that it may make. . .. [Creditor rights] will depend upon the nature of the debt, the debt
instruments, and provisions of local law.").
64 As a general rule, state rules of civil litigation do not permit third parties, including creditors, to
become parties to divorce proceedings. See William D. Taylor III, Third-PartyPractice in Divorce
Cases, 26 FAM. L.Q. 5 (1992). An exception may exist for the secured creditor who makes a
"claim for immediate ownership" based on the debtor spouse(s)' substantial default. See Brett R.
Turner, Division of Third-PartyProperty in Divorce Cases, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 375,
426
(2003).
65
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-318(F) (Supp. 2004).
63
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these decisions. These dual issues of defining distributable debts and setting the
standard for distribution are related to each other. Generally speaking, the more
inclusive the definition of allocable debt, the greater the level of judicial
discretion required to achieve just results. This observation is illustrated in the
following discussion of three doctrines that exclude major categories of debt
from equitable distribution. The three categories of nonmarital debts are
premarital debts (Section A), educational loans (Section B), and debts that do not
satisfy the requirements of the joint purpose doctrine (Section C). 6 6
The analysis of categorical debt exclusions also involves the
consideration of two asset-related doctrines which are part of the equitable
distribution laws in many states and also appear in the Principles: the rule
excluding assets received as gifts by one spouse from a third party and the socalled "dissipation doctrine." As described in Section D, the gift exclusion does
not provide a helpful analogy in formulating debt-exclusion rules. By way of
contrast, the dissipation doctrine provides a sound basis for establishing a final
category of excluded debts. The doctrine typically provides for the adjustment of
equitable distribution orders under certain defined circumstances where one party
has wasted particular assets prior to divorce. As discussed in Section E, the
doctrine can be extended to exclude debts incurred in a wasteful fashion in the
same limited circumstances.
A. Debts Incurred Prior to Marriage
The provisions in the Principles defining distributable assets and debts
create an exclusion for both assets acquired and debts incurred by one partner
prior to marriage. 7 This limitation, relating to the duration of the marriage,
reflects the financial partnership model of marriage. Within this model, the

An additional characterization rule, which operates to remove another category of debts from
distribution, involves secured loans incurred to purchase or maintain an asset which itself is
characterized as nonmarital and not subject to distribution, and loans with a similar purpose for
which the purchased or enhanced property does not necessarily serve as security for repayment.
Thus, "it seems logical that a debt incurred by a spouse in connection with nonmarital property
would be nonmarital." McGuire v. McGuire, 652 N.W.2d 293, 304 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002). Beyond
characterization as marital or nonmarital, a loan's association with a particular marital asset may
also influence the exercise of judicial discretion regarding the who-gets-what issue relating to
66

marital (distributable) loans. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8,

§

4.09 cmt. g, at 737 ("Secured debts are ordinarily characterized and allocated with the asset that
secures them: If the asset is marital, then in reckoning the division of marital property the asset's
value is reduced by the value of its accompanying liability."); 2 TURNER, supra note 61, § 6:99, at
531-32. But see Williams v. Williams, 108 S.W.3d 629, 638 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to
"offset"
loans and the assets that secured them).
67
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8,

68

§ 4.03.

The Principlesand existing state laws also establish a "closing date" to mark the end of asset and

debt acquisition. See id.

24.

§§

4.03(4)-(5); GREGORY ET AL., FIFTY STATE GUIDE, supra note 22,

§

10-
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equitable authority of the divorce court extends to the economic results of the
spouses' activities during the period of their marital partnership.69
As to assets, this distinction drawn by the Principlesbetween premarital
assets and property acquired during marriage does not appear in all of the state
law provisions defining judicial authority at the time of divorce. Thus, a number
of state equitable distribution laws take an "all property" approach to defining
distributable assets.o The benefits of including premarital assets for distribution
include avoiding the need to clearly characterize assets as marital or nonmarital,
which requires the sometimes difficult determination of when each asset was
acquired and the possibility that courts working with a larger pool of assets can
achieve the fairest economic results in individual cases.'
Whichever approach is taken to including premarital assets within
equitable distribution under state law, the question arises whether premarital
liabilities of the divorcing couple will receive the same treatment. Although the
divorce codes in most states provide a legislative answer to the question of
including premarital assets, the question as to debts has largely been left to the
courts.72 Often, in formulating a rule for debts, the state courts have looked to
existing provisions regarding premarital assets. For example, in Alford v.
Alford, the Tennessee Supreme Court defined distributable debts to exclude
premarital debts by reference to the statutory definition of distributable marital
property as "property ... acquired by either or both spouses during the course of
the marriage." 7 4 In a similar manner, in light of a broader property statute that
included premarital assets for distribution, the North Dakota Supreme Court
decided to characterize debts incurred prior to marriage as marital debts.
The rules in a given jurisdiction regarding the inclusion of premarital
assets and debts in equitable distribution are intertwined with the legal standards
69 Exceptions

exist to the general rule discussed in the text which defines distributable assets and
debts by reference to the beginning and end of the marriage. For example, both the Principlesand
numerous state laws allow for distribution of the increase in value of premarital assets. See
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.04; GREGORY ET AL., FIFTY
STATE GUIDE, supra note 22, § 396. In addition, under the Principles, the premarital assets
themselves are gradually recharacterized over time as distributable marital property. See
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.12; see also infra text
accompanying notes 78-82.
70 See GREGORY ET AL., FIFTY STATE GUIDE, supra note 22, § 2.08 n. 118 (listing seventeen states
that take an "all property" approach).
71 See KRAUSE & MEYER, supra note 1, at 317-19.
72As described earlier, most state distribution statutes are completely silent as to debt allocation.
See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. Furthermore, with few exceptions, the state statutes that
authorize debt allocation do not include a definition of distributable debts. But see D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-910 (LexisNexis 1997) (referring to distribution of debts "acquired during the marriage").
7 120 S.W.3d 810 (Tenn. 2003).
74 Id. at 813 (citing the state equitable distribution statute currently codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-4-121(b)(1)(A) (2001)).
7 See Neidviecky v. Neidviecky, 657 N.W.2d 255, 259-60 (N.D. 2003); see also Capehart v.
Capehart, 705 N.E.2d 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming the trial court's equitable distribution
order, which included the wife's premarital education loan as a distributable debt).
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by which courts determine the parties' respective shares of the resulting pool of
assets and debts. 76 For example, the Principles establish a fifty-fifty distribution
standard for the allocation of both assets and debts, and the related commentary
explains that this equal-shares standard would not be workable in a regime that
included premarital (separate) assets in the definition of assets subject to
distribution.n The absence of judicial discretion to preserve such separate
property to its owner would predictably produce unfair results in some cases.
The general approach toward treating premarital assets and debts in an
evenhanded manner, illustrated by the examples discussed above from the
Principles (separate treatment for both), the Tennessee Supreme Court (same)
and the North Dakota Supreme Court (no separate treatment for either premarital
debts or premarital assets), finds a major exception in another section of the
Principles. Namely, the Principles establish a recharacterization provision for
assets, but not debts, in long-term marriages. Thus, in marriages that exceed a
certain number of years, premarital assets are gradually recharacterized from
separate property to assets subject to distribution.7 8 This same treatment is not,
however, extended to the premarital debts of the divorcing couple in a long-term
marriage. The Principlesprovide no explanation for this significant difference in
the treatment of assets and debts.
The explanation provided in the commentary accompanying the
Principles for asset recharacterization refers to the expectations of partners in
long-term marriages. These individuals may come to expect that the "property
their spouses brought into the marriage will be available to them jointly upon
retirement or in an emergency."7 9 The commentary acknowledges that this
statement about spousal expectations "remains untested" by any empirical study
of married couples.so The assumption about spousal expectations, therefore,
must reflect the drafters' own understandings about financial attitudes in
marriage. Furthermore, the absence of debts from the recharacterization
provision must reflect their failure to make a corresponding assumption that
long-term spouses come to expect financial contribution from their partners as to
pre-existing debts.

For a discussion of allocation standards, see infra Part VI.
" See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.03 cmt. a, at 651, 657.
78 Id. § 4.12. An additional provision of the Principles requires the characterization of certain
assets acquired prior to marriage as marital property subject to equitable distribution. Specifically,
section 4.03(6) provides that "[p]roperty acquired during a relationship between the spouses that
immediately preceded their marriage, and which was a domestic-partner relationship as defined by
[the Principles,]is treated as if it were acquired during the marriage." Existing laws in states that
exclude premarital assets from the scope of allocable property do not generally include this
exception. See GREGORY ET AL., FIFTY STATE GUIDE, supra note 22, § 2.03[B][2].
79
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.12 cmt. a, at 781.
76

80

d.

'1See Elijan L. Milne, RecharacterizingSeparateProperty at Divorce, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
307, 330-31 (2007) (challenging these inconsistent assumptions and stating that "[i]f, as the
Principles assert, 'after many years of marriage, spouses typically do not think of their separate-
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The attitude toward debts reflected in the silence here regarding debt
recharacterization illustrates the unspoken attitude about the outstanding
obligations of spouses at the time of divorce that apparently influences many of
the rules in this field. For unarticulated reasons, the principles of sharing that
inform the asset distribution process are sometimes suspended when the subject
of regulation shifts to spousal debt. If the principle of marriage as economic
partnership is, in fact, given consideration in this context, the conclusion may be
reached that a rule allowing for the sharing of debts as well as assets in the
circumstances of the recharacterization provision is consistent with the goals of
equitable distribution law.82
B. Student Loans
Loans used to finance the higher education of one partner during
marriage have received special treatment under the equitable distribution laws of
certain states and the provisions of the Principles dealing with debt distribution
in divorce proceedings. Unlike other debts incurred during marriage, the
Principles take the position that "[d]ebt . . . incurred to finance a spouse's

education .. . is treated as the separate obligation of the spouse whose education
it financed." 8 3 Thus, the student spouse is left with the sole responsibility for
repayment following divorce. Among the states that have addressed this
question, some have taken the approach proposed by the Principles,but others
have included educational loans under general rules characterizing debts incurred
during marriage as marital and distributable.84
According to the commentary accompanying the Principles,the primary
rationale for excepting student loans incurred during marriage from the general
definition of distributable debts is that educational debts "were incurred to
acquire a nondivisible financial benefit-the education-that continues after
divorce and inures exclusively to the benefit of that spouse."" The reference
property assets as separate,' then it is also likely that spouses do not typically think of their separate
debts as separate as the marriage progresses").
82 See id. at 330-31 (opining that the recharacterization of assets but not debts could produce unfair
results in particular cases and recommending that states adopting the recharacterization provision
"should also provide for the recharacterization of separate debts").
83 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.09(2)(d). Even under this
type of exclusionary rule, student loan monies actually used for family support may not be
excluded as an "educational loan" at the time of divorce. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Speirs, 956
P.2d 622, 625 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming trial court determination that a portion of wife's
law school loans were used for family support and therefore subject to allocation at divorce); 2
TURNER, supra note 61, § 6:97, at 515.
* See GREGORY ET AL., Firry STATE GUIDE, supra note 22, § 10.03[B], at 10-28 to -30.
8 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.09(2)(d) cmt. g, at 738; see
also Van Bussum v. Van Bussum, 728 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to allow
allocation of loans that supported the husband's "acquisition of his medical license" because "a
professional degree cannot be considered marital property" and "the debt attendant to the
acquisition of a nonmarital asset must be borne by the party who will reap the benefit from it"). In
an analogous fashion, in jurisdictions that exclude premarital assets from equitable distribution,
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here to "acquisition of a nondivisible financial benefit" highlights provisions in
the Principlesand state equitable distribution laws that characterize the degree,
education or enhanced earning capacity acquired by one spouse during marriage
as a non-distributable asset in divorce proceedings. 86
This rationale does not, however, justify the categorical exclusion of
educational loans from equitable distribution in all cases. In spite of the
characterization rule regarding educational degrees at the time of divorce, the
education of one spouse may nevertheless be a source of significant financial
benefit for both.87 For example, the standard of living established during
marriage and the value of assets subject to distribution at divorce may be
enhanced by the degreed spouse's increased earning capacity resulting from
higher education. Furthermore, this enhanced earning capacity may be shared by
the non-degreed partner post-divorce under the compensatory payment doctrine
of the Principlesor state alimony and spousal maintenance provisions. Thus, in
some cases, both partners may derive benefit from the education completed by
one of them during their marriage" even though the degree itself cannot be
characterized as an asset subject to distribution at the time of divorce. Including
the outstanding student loan balance in the pool of distributable debts at the time
of divorce enables the court to take all of these matters into consideration in
reaching the fairest overall result in each case.
As with the issue of excluding premarital assets and debts, described in
the last Section, the analysis of rules regarding the categorical exclusion of
educational loans must take into account the amount of discretion conferred on
trial judges under applicable equitable distribution laws. A nondiscretionary
distribution standard, such as the fifty-fifty distribution rule proposed by the
Principles, is not easily coupled with a rule including educational loans for
distribution. Here, the court would lack discretion to assign primary or full
responsibility for the outstanding loan balance to the student spouse, even in
cases where the other partner did not, in fact, derive any financial benefit from
the education. Such a result might be unfair. By way of contrast, treating student
loans as distributable debts need not produce unfair results in such cases, if the
debts incurred during marriage to improve a premarital asset have been characterized as
"nonmarital." See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 652 N.W.2d 293, 304 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002) ("[I]t
seems logical that a debt incurred by a spouse in connection with nonmarital property would be
nonmarital.").
86 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.07(2), at 694
("Occupational licenses and educational degrees are not marital property."); id. § 4.07 cmt. c, at
705 ("With the exception of New York, claims that professional licenses and degrees are marital
property when acquired during the marriage have been rejected by every state high court that has
considered the claim.").
87 See 2 TURNER, supra note 61, § 6:97, at 515.
88

See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, ch. 5 (describing a

system of post-divorce compensatory payments for lower-earning divorced partners); GREGORY ET
AL., FIFTY STATE GUIDE, supra note 22,

§ 9.03-.05

(describing state alimony laws).

See, e.g., Webb v. Webb, No. CA977-09-167, 1998 WL 820838, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 30,
1998) (characterizing the pursuit of a degree by one spouse as effort intended to achieve "a
common goal of the parties to increase their economic standing").
89
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distribution standard authorizes the court to leave the debt with the student
spouse for repayment."
Under a nondiscretionary distribution standard, such as the fifty-fifty rule
of the Principles,an alternative approach is available for balancing the perceived
benefits of equal sharing with the complex facts of many student loan cases.
Specifically, educational loans would be included in the pool of distributable
debts, and the court would have discretion to waive the generally applicable fiftyfifty standard as to these loans on a case by case basis. 91 The rule allowing
discretionary waiver of a generally applicable equality standard as to a particular
category of debts, such as educational loans, acknowledges the special benefit
these debts may bring to one partner without totally excluding them from
distribution in all cases. Such a rule would avoid the simplistic conclusion
reached in the Principles that the exclusion of educational degrees as marital
property requires the corresponding exclusion of the outstanding student loan
balance, a result that ignores the financial benefit of the degree to the nonstudent
spouse in some cases.
C. The Joint Purpose Doctrine
In formulating a definition of marital debt subject to equitable
distribution, the Principles rejected an additional limitation that appears in the
laws of several states, commonly called the "joint purpose" doctrine.92 This rule
provides that the authority of divorce courts to reallocate responsibility for
outstanding debts extends only to those debts incurred for a marital or joint
purpose during marriage.93 Conversely, sole responsibility for any obligation
incurred for a nonmarital purpose must remain with the partner who incurred the
debt.
The debts typically excluded under this limitation are those incurred for
goods or services utilized by just one spouse. Additional factors employed to
identify excludable debts under the joint purpose doctrine may include "who

id. (noting that "treating [student] loans acquired during the marriage as marital debt does not
limit the trial court's ability to award the debts solely to the spouse actually incurring them," which
was the ultimate result in the Webb case); J.M. v. N.M., 844 N.E.2d 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
(allocating student loan, characterized as marital debt, to student spouse and justifying the resulting
unequal distribution by reference to nondistribution of the student's valuable education).
9 As discussed later, this type of discretionary waiver is provided in the Principles for the "excess
debt" of the parties in cases where debts exceed assets at the time of divorce. See infra text
accompanying notes 133-35.
92 See GREGORY ET AL., FIFTY STATE GUIDE, supra note 22, § 10.03[B][2], at 10-25 to -27
(collecting joint purpose debt cases from common law property states).
9 Laws in the community property states establish a definition of community debt, involving some
of the same considerations arising under the joint purpose doctrine described in the text, which
applies during marriageand may also be extended to limit the scope of debts subject to distribution
at divorce. See id. § 10.02[A] (summarizing various approaches to defining community debt
during marriage and distributable debt at divorce in the nine community property states).

9o See
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incurred the debt and when, the purpose of the debt, whether both parties
consented... , and who is better able to pay the debt." 94 By way of illustration,
the following debts were held to be nonmarital and nondistributable under the
joint purpose doctrine: the debt incurred by a husband during marriage for his
own dental work, 95 the debt incurred by a husband during marriage for the
surgery and other medical care of his minor daughter, to whom the wife stood in
loco parentis,96 and the consumer debt totaling $26,807 incurred by the
unemployed husband over the course of a fifteen year marriage for his "personal
and luxury items."97
A thorough assessment of the joint purpose doctrine as a basis for
excluding debts supports the position taken in the Principles, rejecting the
doctrine. The commentary accompanying the Principlesexplains the decision to
reject the joint purpose doctrine by reference to the basic purpose of equitable
distribution law, which involves a fair and manageable unwinding of the marital
partnership. As a general rule, the Principles and existing state laws identify
marital wealth subject to judicial authority by focusing on the bottom line of the
financial balance sheet at the time of divorce, thereby avoiding a specific
accounting for each debit and credit of the marriage. Thus:
The distinction attempted by [the joint benefit rule] is ultimately
unsatisfactory.... It is inherent in the nature of any marriage that some
marital income is expended on items of joint consumption, and some
on items consumed primarily or exclusively by one spouse, but there is
no retrospective review of such expenditures at divorce. 99
Furthermore, "[t]he equitable importance of differences in the spouses'
financial contributions or consumption could not be evaluated in isolation from
the marriage as a whole, because the financial and nonfinancial threads of
marriage cannot ordinarily be unraveled . . . .100
According to this view,
accounting for all of these matters would result in an inexact and overly
burdensome valuation exercise in each case. Within this general model, with its
focus on the bottom line, it would be arbitrary and unfair to segregate certain
outstanding debits at the end of the union for "separate" treatment under the joint
purpose doctrine.
Indeed, as to assets acquired during marriage, state laws subscribe
uniformly to the view that a particular asset acquired during marriage is not

94 Phyl Bean, I Due: CharacterizingDebt in Marriage Dissolution, 65 BENCH & B. MINN. 30, 31
(2008); see also 2 TURNER, supra note 61, § 6:97, at 503 ("Whether a given debt benefits the
parties jointly depends heavily upon the facts.").
s See Becker v. Becker, 489 S.E.2d 909, 913-14 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
96
See Crisp v. Crisp, 486 S.E.2d 485, 487-88 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
97
Mathew v. Palmer, 589 N.W.2d 343, 348 (Neb. Ct. App. 1999).
98
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.09 cmt. g, at 737-38.
99
Id. at 737.
'" Id. § 4.10 cmt. b, at 752.
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excluded from the pool of property subject to distribution simply because it was
acquired by (even if tremendous personal effort was involved), belonged to, or
was enjoyed by just one of the partners during marriage.10 ' These widelyaccepted property rules easily allow for the enhancement of wealth for both
divorcing partners arising from the sole efforts and resulting assets of just one of
them.
The joint benefit doctrine, however, fails to extend this sharing principle
to the reduction in wealth caused by outstanding debts associated with the
activities and goals of just one partner, illustrating once again that debts are not
The
easily regarded as part of the economic partnership of marriage.
commentary to the Principles highlights and rejects the inconsistent attitudes
about debts and assets inherent in the joint purpose doctrine as follows: "[A]ll
assets held by the spouses at divorce that were acquired with marital funds are
marital assets. . . . The same logic compels an analogous rule for debts: Who

incurred the debt or for what purpose, is not relevant to its characterization."l02
Unfortunately, state court opinions adopting the joint purpose doctrine
generally offer no explanation for the judicial reluctance to treat liabilities, like
assets, as part of the economic partnership of marriage. An exception to this
observation appears in the 2002 case of McGuire v. McGuire,03 where the
Nebraska Court of Appeals discussed its reasons for adopting the limited
definition of marital debt as "one incurred during marriage . . . by either spouse

or both spouses for joint benefit of the parties." 04 The McGuire court applied
this joint purpose rule to reverse the trial court's division of a debt incurred by
the wife after the spouses were estranged and without the consent of her husband,
for the educational support of the couple's adult daughter.'0 o
The court in McGuire justified its decision to exclude debts under the
joint purpose doctrine by invoking the partnership model of marriage. The court
first noted that Nebraska law excludes two categories of assets from distribution:
gifts received from third parties and premarital assets.106 The court observed that

10' The exception to this general rule for gifts acquired by one spouse during marriage is discussed

text accompanying notes 110-11.
infra
102 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supranote 8, at 738; see also Alford
v. Alford,
120 S.W.3d 810, 813 (Tenn. 2003) (rejecting the joint purpose doctrine and adopting a definition of
marital debt that tracked the statutory definition of marital assets as "property . . . acquired by either
or both spouses during the course of the marriage") (quoting the Tennessee equitable distribution
statute). The Alford court also noted that trial courts retained discretion in allocating shares of
marital debt so broadly defined, and that relevant factors might include the same considerations that
arise under the joint purpose characterization doctrine such as the debt's purpose, who incurred the
debt, who benefitted from it, and who has the ability to repay it. Id. at 813-14.
103 652 N.W.2d 293 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002).
' Id. at 305.
105 The late timing of the debt in McGuire might have opened the door to two additional bases for
exclusion: possible characterization as a post-marital debt, see supra note 68, or the theory of
dissipation, see infra Part V.E. The McGuire opinion did not mention this theory.
106 Id. at 303.
For discussion of the gift exclusion, see infra Part V.D. For discussion of the
premarital property exclusion, see supra Part V.A.
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these assets are not acquired as the result of any spousal efforts made during the
course of the marriage and therefore fall outside the scope of the marriage
partnership.'o7 By way of contrast, according to the court, all other assets
acquired during marriage reflect "joint effort" and are therefore distributable at
the time of divorce.
Next, the McGuire court extended this basic notion of economic
partnership to debts, stating: "If the marital estate is defined as property acquired
by the parties' joint efforts, it seems that marital debts should have an element of
being incurred as part of that joint effort."' 0 8 On this basis, the court accepted the
joint purpose doctrine, excluding from distribution those debts that were not
incurred for the couple's joint benefit or for a shared purpose. This reasoning,
however, is faulty because the court did not employ the same definition of joint
effort in discussing assets and debts. Specifically, in shifting to the discussion of
debts, the court formulated a stricter definition of "joint effort," requiring the
participation of both spouses.
As to assets acquired during marriage, the laws in Nebraska and
elsewhere impose no requirement that both partners worked to acquire a
particular asset in order to characterize it as "marital" and subject to distribution.
Rather, the "joint" dimension of "partnership" property means that the efforts and
activities of one or both parties resulted in particular acquisitions that add up to
the sum of partnership property at the end of the relationship. The requirement
under the joint purpose debt doctrine of dual participation as to each debt, as
adopted by the McGuire court, is a much more limiting standard. This analytical
transition, unacknowledged by the court, involved a narrowed acceptance of the
principle of equitable sharing at the time of divorce, as applied to debts rather
than assets.
D. A False Analogy: The Exclusion of Gifts from the Definition of
Distributable Assets
In explaining its decision to adopt the joint purpose doctrine,'0 9 the
Nebraska Court of Appeals in the McGuire case referred to the categorical
exclusion of gifts from the definition of marital assets subject to distribution.
The exclusion of gifts in this manner from the pool of distributable assets is a
common feature of state equitable distribution laws.1 0 Similarly, the Principles
create an exception to the broad definition of marital property for "[i]nheritances,
including bequests and devises, and gifts from third parties, . . . even if acquired

107McGuire, 652

08

N.W.2d at 304.

d

109See id. at 303; see also Brett R. Turner, Division of Debts Upon Divorce, 20 EQUITABLE

DISTRIBUTION J. 61, 64 (2003) ("Just as some types of property acquired during the marriage should
generally be retained by one spouse (e.g., gifts, inheritances), some types of debt incurred by one
spouse should be charged to that spouse alone.").
"o See GREGORY ET AL., FAMILY LAW, supra note 7, § 10.06.
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during marriage."'" This familiar asset exception to the broad financial sweep of
equitable distribution law does not, however, provide a sound analogy for the
exclusion of debts under the joint purpose doctrine.
Courts and commentators have provided two basic rationales for
excluding gifts from the pool of assets subject to division in divorce proceedings.
The first rationale involves honoring the intention of the person who made a gift
to the donee spouse." 2 Where the donor of a gift and the donee spouse are
related to each other, the gift exclusion also operates to "keep assets in the
family," a common goal as to donative transfers." 3 Deference to the wishes of
the person making the gift in this context is consistent with a general and strong
commitment in the law of property to protecting and enforcing the wishes of
generous donors.' 14
This rationale for the exclusion of gifted assets from equitable
distribution, involving the special protection extended to donative intent under
the law of property, has no application in the debt context. Although an
interested third party, the lending creditor, is present in the debt scenario, creditor
interests have not been asserted as a reason for removing certain debts from the
scope of equitable distribution. Indeed, protection for creditor interests in this
setting arises under the law of contracts, which preserves the creditor's predivorce contractual claims against one or both spouses in spite of the divorce
court's reallocation of responsibility for repayment.' 15
The second rationale for excluding gifts from equitable distribution
claims at the time of divorce involves the nature of gifts as financial "windfalls."
That is, a gift received during marriage simply drops into the lap of the recipient
due to no effort on the part of either or both of the spouses, but due rather to the
donor's generosity. According to this analysis, which highlights the economic
partnership model of marriage, the gift received by one spouse from a third party
is not part of the plusses and minuses on the economic balance sheet of the
marriage.' 6 This same observation cannot be made as to debts incurred or assets

Il PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supranote 8, § 4.03(2) at 663.

See, e.g., Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308-09 (Utah 1988) (construing state equitable
distribution statute to exclude gifts and stating that this result "accords with the normal intent of
donors or deceased persons that their gifts and inheritances should be kept within their family and
succession should not be diverted because of divorce").
113 id
114 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISsOLuTION, supra note 8, § 4.12(5) (authorizing donor
of premarital gift to except the gifted asset from the process of recharacterization of premarital
assets as marital assets in long-term marriages); ROGER W. ANDERSON, UNDERSTANDING TRUST
AND ESTATES 36-37 (2d ed. 1999) (describing the importance of testamentary intent in the laws
governing wills); D. BARLOW BURKE & JOSEPH A. SNOE, PROPERTY 61-63 (2d ed. 2004) (describing
the importance of the element of donor intent in the laws regulating gifts of personal property).
115 For a discussion of creditor rights, see supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
116 See, e.g., Hussey v. Hussey, 312 S.E.2d 267, 270 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (construing the term
"property of the marriage" in the state equitable distribution statute to exclude gifts because, inter
alia, "marital property is that property of the parties which arises from or to some extent is
augmented by the efforts of the marital parties").
112
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acquired during marriage resulting from the active financial participation of one
or both spouses. Even if these transactions benefit just one party, they are not
excludable as passive, non-partnership adjustments to the marital balance sheet.
Thus, the "windfall" rationale for excluding gifts from equitable distribution does
not justify the exclusion of debts under the joint purpose doctrine.
As described at length in these last two Sections, the exclusion of debts
under the joint purpose doctrine is not consistent with the economic partnership
model of marriage, which generally governs the definition of distributable assets
and debts. Another aspect of equitable distribution law, called the dissipation
doctrine, provides an alternative to the over-broad joint purpose doctrine as a
basis for excluding debts in a manner that can be more easily reconciled with the
partnership model of marriage.
E. The Dissipation Doctrine
As described above, the joint purpose doctrine may be applied to remove
from equitable distribution any outstanding debt incurred by one spouse without
a joint or marital purpose. It thereby creates a major exception to the general
principle of equitable distribution law that divorce is not a time for retrospective
accounting for the individual acquisitions and expenditures of each spouse during
marriage. An additional doctrine, which appears in the Principles and the
equitable distribution laws of many states, called the "dissipation doctrine" 17
creates a more refined exception to this same principle. By way of contrast to the
joint purpose doctrine, the dissipation doctrine more carefully restricts the
circumstances in which particular financial transactions can be targeted for
special treatment in equitable distribution. Indeed, as discussed in this Section,
the dissipation doctrine provides a basis for screening out debts that should not,
in fairness, be allocated in divorce proceedings.
The dissipation doctrine is typically concerned with the removal by one
spouse of particular assets from the marital estate shortly before divorce, so that
the pool of distributable assets and the potential share of the other partner are
significantly depleted."' 8 For example, the relevant provision in the Principles
specifies gifts to third parties, intentional misconduct, and negligence by one
partner as types of conduct that may require the court to formulate a remedy for
the nondissipating partner." 9 The test for dissipation varies among state laws,
but common elements are the depletion of a substantial part of the marital estate
by one partner, at a time near the end of the marriage, for a nonmarital purpose,

"' See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DIssOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.10, at 750; GREGORY ET
AL., FAMILY LAW, supra note 7, § 10.12[D][2].
"8 See GREGORY ET AL., FAMILY LAW, supra note 7, § 10.12[D][2]; J. Thomas Oldham, "Romance

Without FinanceAin't Got No Chance": Development of the Doctrine of Dissipationin Equitable
DistributionStates, 21 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIM. LAW. 501, 506-19 (2008).
"9 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8,

§ 4.10,

at 750.
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and possibly with the specific intention of reducing assets for distribution.120 As
reflected in this list of factors, the general rationale for the dissipation doctrine is
that fairness requires certain adjustments to the usual results under equitable
distribution principles for last-minute financial maneuvering by one partner that
depleted the marital estate.
The usual remedy for the nondissipating spouse when the other has
dissipated assets is receipt of a greater share of the remaining property. 12 1 For
example, the relevant section of the Principlesis titled "Financial Misconduct as
Ground for Unequal Division of Marital Property" and permits the court to waive
the Principle'sgeneral requirement of equal distribution of assets in cases where
dissipation has occurred.122
Reported cases and scholarly discussion regarding dissipation generally
focus on the consumption or wasting of assets of the marriage shortly before
divorce. 123 However, the doctrine can be applied as well to the creation of new
debts. For example, in In re Marriage of Fennelly & Breckenfelder,'24 the
husband incurred $22,000 of credit card debt after his wife filed for divorce,
"offered no explanation why his debt accelerated at the end of the marriage [,
and] taunted [his wife] that she was going to have to pay it all."1 2 5 The Iowa
Supreme Court accepted the wife's argument that her husband "indirectly
dissipated their marital assets-rather than depleting the parties' assets, [he]
accumulated a large amount of debt[, and] . . . the result is the same. 126 The
court applied the factors established for identifying dissipated assets under state
law-"proximity of the expenditure to the parties' separation, . . . whether the
expenditure was typical[,] . . . whether the expenditure benefited the 'joint'
marital enterprise[,] . . . and . . . the amount of . . . the expenditure" 127 -in

concluding that the husband's credit card debt constituted a dissipation.
Notably, the Fennelly court's remedy for this dissipation was
characterization of the debt as nonmarital and therefore not subject to distribution
between the divorcing spouses.128 The court assigned the $22,000 credit card
debt solely to the husband for repayment before dividing the remaining debts and
assets equally between the parties under the state's discretionary distribution
standard. The Iowa high court explained that "where the dissipation is debt, it is

120 Oldham, supra note
121 Id. at 518.

118, at 507-08.

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.10.
123See Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Spouse's DissipationofMaritalAssets Priorto Divorce as Factor
in Divorce Court's Determinationof PropertyDivision, 41 A.L.R. 4th 416 (1985).
124 737 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 1997).
125 Id. at 105.
126 id.
122

127
28

'

Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 106.
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appropriate to set aside the debt for the spouse who incurred the debt and not
include it in the marital estate."1 2 9
As illustrated in the Fennelly case, the dissipation doctrine can serve as a
vehicle for removing certain debts from distribution in divorce proceedings, in
the limited circumstances where fairness requires an adjustment to the general
notion that the acquisitions and expenditures of both spouses are part of the
marital partnership. The scope of the doctrine is narrower than the alternative
joint purpose doctrine. In Fennelly, the court considered the timing of the debt,
its proportionate size, the "normality" of the debt-producing conduct within the
couple's marriage, and the intent of the debtor in incurring the debt. By way of
contrast to this focused inquiry, the joint purpose doctrine may operate to exclude
from distribution any and all outstanding debts determined by the court to have
been incurred for the sole benefit of one spouse or a non-marital purpose. As
noted in the commentary to the Principlesrejecting the joint purpose doctrine,13 0
this rule treats debts in a more restrictive fashion than assets and is inconsistent
with the partnership principles that generally govern equitable distribution law.
On the other hand, application of the dissipation doctrine to liabilities, as in the
Fennelly case, is well-tailored to accomplish the evenhanded treatment of assets
and debts, and the identification of those debts whose exclusion is fair and
consistent with partnership principles.
VI. STANDARDS FOR CALCULATING SHARES
Once distributable debts and assets have been identified under the rules
discussed earlier in this Article, the divorce court must then determine the share
of marital wealth to be allocated to each spouse. This final aspect of equitable
distribution doctrine, involving the creation and application of standards for
determining asset and debt shares, reveals some of the same ambivalence about
transferring debt responsibility observed in other areas of equitable distribution
law.
A. The Principles'Fifty-Fifty Standard
Under the standards set out in the Principles, as a general rule, "marital
property and marital debts are divided at dissolution so that the spouses receive

Id. at 106 n.6. A different remedy was applied in Brzuszkiewicz v. Brzuszkiewicz, 813 N.Y.S.2d
793, 795 (App. Div. 2006), where the trial court found that the husband had dissipated much of the
marital estate both by wasting assets and acquiring new debt including "excessive credit card debt."
The court treated the remaining assets and the outstanding debts as allocable under the equitable
distribution statute, and awarded all of the assets to the wife and the debts to the husband. Id.
30
' See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.09 cmt. g, at 737-38.
12
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net shares equal in value."' 3 1 Thus, the standard is one of equal division after the
debts and assets have been aggregated into a "net estate." The rationale provided
for this equal distribution rule is "an ideological norm of the marriage
partnership."l 32
The provision in the Principles establishing this general rule of equal
distribution of the net marital estate also creates an exception' 3 3 for cases where
[m]arital debts exceed marital assets, and it is just and equitable to
assign the excess debt unequally, because of a significant disparity in
the spouses' financial capacity, their participation in the decision to
incur the debt, or their consumption of the goods or services that the
debt was incurred to acquire.' 34
Thus, in excess debt cases, the Principles confer discretion on the trial judge to
make a fair distribution of the amount of excess debt, based on equitable
considerations. The likely assumption made here is that judicial discretion would
be exercised to hold the spouse who incurred the excess debts responsible for
more than the usual fifty percent share of them. This exception to the fifty-fifty
distribution requirement is yet another instance in equitable distribution doctrine
where a tacit assumption has been made about the nature of debt and the effect of
imposing responsibility upon one individual for the debts incurred by another.
No explanation is provided for the determination that judicial discretion to
deviate from the Principles' equal shares standard is appropriate in excess debt
cases. 135

131 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.09(1), at 732; see also LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801(4)(b) (2009) ("The court shall divide the community assets and
liabilities so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value.").
132 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8, § 4.09 cmt. c, at 748; see also
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 21, at 75, 102 (highlighting the "ideal of marriage as an egalitarian
liberal community," as well as normative goals, as justifications for the equal distribution standard
in state divorce laws).
1 Besides the excess debt exception discussed in the text, additional exceptions to the fifty-fifty
distribution rule are created under the Principles for cases where one spouse improperly dissipated
assets near the end of the marriage. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra
note 8, § 4.09(2)(b). Exceptions are also created where the court utilizes unequal distribution as
part of the court's "compensation" order under the provisions that would replace state alimony and
spousal maintenance laws. See id. at § 4.09(2)(a), at 732.
1 4

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 8,

§

4.09(2)(c); see also CAL. FAM.

CODE § 2622(b) (West 2004) (excepting "cases where debts exceed assets" from the state's equal
distribution rule); Marsha Garrison, Equitable Distribution in New York: Results and Reform:
Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce
Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 731-32 (1991) (recommending that discretionary "equitable
distribution concepts should apply when a couple's net worth is negative . . . , [and that] [flor larger
marital estates, a presumption of equal division should apply").
13 The intuitive appeal of the exception is reflected in the following comment by Professor David
Westfall: "The general rule contained in Section 4.09(1), mandating an equal division of marital
property and marital debts is eminently reasonable, as [is the section] permitting under specified
circumstances an unequal division of debts where they exceed marital assets." David Westfall,
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The contrast between the treatment of asset acquisition and debt creation
under the "excess debt" provision is very telling. The partner who works hard
and hits the financial jackpot in (even a short-term) marriage has his or her
wealth automatically diminished by one-half at the time of divorce under the
Principles' basic fifty-fifty distribution rule. But the burden of debt incurred
through the decisions and activities of one spouse during the marriage need not
be similarly shared, if debts exceed assets. Clearly, in the eyes of the drafters,
the prospect of one partner leaving marriage with an overall debt burden that he
or she did not create is more onerous and potentially unfair than the prospect of
one partner enduring a major reduction in his or her positive financial bottom line
as a result of divorce.
B. Distribution Standards under State Laws
Existing state divorce laws do not uniformly follow the general rule of
equal distribution proposed under the Principles.'36 Many state equitable
distribution laws confer greater discretion on trial judges by requiring a fair (but
not necessarily equal) distribution of debts and assets based on the facts and
circumstances of each case.13 1 Others confer discretion by allowing the court to
waive a presumptive equal distribution in order to achieve the fairest results in
each case.138
In keeping with their general silence about debt distribution, most state
equitable distribution statutes fail to establish a standard for debt allocation.
When the courts are called upon to fill in the resulting gap, statutory standards
governing asset distribution serve as a logical reference point. For example, in
formulating a standard for debt allocation, the Minnesota appellate court in In re
Marriage of Lehrer 39 extended the statutory standard requiring the trial courts to
divide assets in a "just and equitable"l 40 manner. Under this standard, the Lehrer
court affirmed the trial court's assignment of outstanding credit card debts in the

Unprincipled Family Dissolution: The American Law Institute's Recommendations for Spousal
Support and Division of Property, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 917, 947 (2004). Professor
Westfall does not explain why he considers the exception to fifty-fifty distribution in excess debt
cases to be reasonable.
136 See 2 TURNER, supra note 61, § 8.1, at 763-64 (describing alternative distribution standards).
13 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (West 2000) ("[T]he court shall . . . divide the marital
property and marital debts in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant
factors including [five named factors]."); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(C) (2008) ("The court shall
also have the authority to apportion and order the payment of the debts of the parties . . . based
u on [the same list of eleven nonexclusive factors used to guide the judicial division of assets].").
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(1) (West 2006) ("[I]n distributing the marital assets and
liabilities between the parties, the court must begin with the premise that the distribution should be
equal, unless there is a justification for unequal distribution ....
1'9 No. C6-99-1697, 2000 WL 687641 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
14 Id at *3 (quoting the Minnesota equitable distribution statute).
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amount of $10,000 to the husband and the wife's gambling debts in the amount
of $3500, clearly characterized as an allocable marital debt, to her. 14 1
Not all state courts, however, have followed the established legislative
rule regarding asset shares in formulating a debt distribution standard. For
example, in the 2003 case of Williams v. Williams,142 the Arkansas appellate
court observed that the state equitable distribution statute "mandates that marital
property be divided equally unless the court finds that such a division is
inequitable" 43 but ruled that this statute "does not apply to the division of marital
debts; hence, in Arkansas, there is no presumption that an equal division of debts
must occur."'"
The distribution award in Williams, affirmed on appeal, awarded
approximately one-half of the parties' assets (totaling over fourteen million
dollars) to each of them. Absent a presumption as to debt shares, the court
applied an open-ended "fairness" standard and awarded approximately two-thirds
of the marital debts (totaling over seven million dollars) to the husband, and the
remaining one-third to the wife.14 5 Factors that supported this allocation favoring
the wife included the husband's expenditures on extramarital relationships during
marriage, his dissipation of marital assets prior to the divorce, and the spouses'
unequal post-divorce ability to repay the debts.14 6 Notably, these considerations
did not cause the trial court to exercise its authority to waive the statutory
presumption of equal shares as to the parties' assets, and the Williams opinion did
not discuss this matter.
Many of the debt distribution rules discussed in this Article differ from
corresponding asset distribution rules in ways that impose greater restrictions on
judicial authority to reallocate debts, as compared to assets, in divorce
proceedings. For example, the joint purpose doctrine, discussed in Part V,
Section C, eliminates judicial authority over debts that are determined to have
been incurred for a non-marital or non-joint purpose. By way of contrast, the
decision of the Arkansas court in the Williams case, rejecting the statutory equal
shares presumption that applied to asset distribution, created broader judicial
authority to reallocate debts. This result is inconsistent with the general
observation made throughout this Article that debt allocation rules reflect
discomfort with the possibility of transferring too much debt from one partner to
another at the time of divorce.

141Id. at *1. As to asset distribution in Lehrer, the husband received roughly $14,500 of home sale
proceeds and a truck worth $3500, and the wife received approximately $20,000 of home sale
ecuity and certain un-assessed personal property. Id.
'4' 108 S.W.3d 629 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003).
143 Id. at 638.
4 Id.
145 Id. at 637. As to most of the marital debts, the court did not state whether the husband or wife
or both had incurred them.
146

Id. at 640.
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On the other hand, the open-ended fairness rule of the Williams case
requires application by the courts on a case-by-case basis and in this process
judges may decide to be conservative in reallocating debts. By definition,
broader judicial discretion could be exercised in various ways-to leave predivorce debt responsibility unchanged, to order an equal sharing of outstanding
obligations, or to require another result that the court deems most just. As
described above, the court in Williams exercised discretion by assigning
responsibility for one-third of the marital debt to the wife and two-thirds to the
husband.14 7 It is unclear, however, how much pre-divorce debt was reallocated
by this order, because the opinion does not indicate who was liable for the
millions of dollars of debts in the case prior to the couple's divorce.
The Arkansas fairness standard for allocating debts was applied in the
Williams case to benefit the wife, who was clearly the financially weaker partner
in the Williams' marriage. The next part of this Article assesses other debt
allocation rules in light of their impact based on the relative economic status of
divorcing spouses.
VII. THE GENDER DIMENSION
The rules regulating the power of courts to reallocate responsibility for
outstanding debts at the time of divorce can be evaluated in terms of their likely
disparate impact on divorcing spouses based on relative economic status. Of
course, in most cases, men enjoy a higher financial status than their female
partners, resulting in a gender effect when particular rules consistently impose
benefits or burdens based on relative economic status.148 In the case of Williams
v. Williams,149 for example, discussed at length in the last Section, the husband's
income was $778,495 per year while the wife was unemployed at the time of the
couple's divorce. 50 The Williams opinion does not indicate how much of the
multi-million dollar marital estate belonged to each partner prior to the divorce.
Based on the income information, however, Mrs. Williams clearly emerged as
the partner in a lower financial status at the time of divorce.
As described in the last Section, the refusal of the Arkansas appellate
court in Williams to extend a fifty-fifty distribution rule to debt allocation
enabled the trial court to exercise discretion in favor of the weaker financial
partner, the wife. The court ordered Mrs. Williams, who received one-half of the
marital assets, to assume responsibility for just one-third of the marital debts. Of
course, trial courts can also choose, under such a discretionary rule, to favor the

47

1 Id. at 637.
148Scholars have

evaluated other aspects of marital debt through the lens of gender. See, e.g., Peter
C. Alexander, Building a Doll's House: A Feminist Analysis of Marital Debt Dischargeabilityin
Bankruptcy, 48 VILL. L. REv. 381 (2003) (evaluating the disparate impact by gender of laws
governing post-divorce bankruptcy).
149 108 S.W.3d 629 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003).
"0 Id. at 632.
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financially stronger partner, if the facts of the case indicate that such a result
would be equitable. By way of contrast, a fixed fifty-fifty distribution rule, like
that established under the Principles,removes judicial discretion to benefit or
burden either partner in the assignment of post-divorce responsibility for debts.
Which partner benefits from the automatic shifting of debts in each case will
depend on who was liable for the distributable debts going into the divorce. That
is, the partner with greater pre-divorce responsibility will benefit from the postdivorce rule of equal responsibility. Thus, neither the fifty-fifty rule of the
Principlesnor the alternative discretionary standard of the Williams case is sure
to benefit either the financially superior or the financially weaker spouse in every
case.
As to other debt allocation rules, their impact for divorcing partners
based on relative financial status is not uniform. For example, as discussed
above, certain states allow trial courts to avoid the reallocation of debts
altogether in individual cases (Part III) or exclude significant categories of debt,
such as those not incurred for a joint purpose, from reallocation in every case
(Part V, Section C). The financial impact of excluding debts from distribution
under these rules for the partner in a lower financial status may be either positive
or negative, depending on other facts and circumstances. Thus, excluding certain
categories of debts from distribution, or permitting the court to skip over debt
allocation altogether, will be beneficial to the lower-earning partner if the other
was solely or primarily responsible for the excluded debts prior to divorce. On
the other hand, if the lower-earning spouse in fact incurred the major debts
during marriage, the effect of rules limiting the pool of allocable debts produces a
burdensome result for that individual.' 5 1
As a general rule, then, no particular allocation rule, or set of rules, is a
guarantee of greater protection for either spouse based on relative economic
status at the time of divorce. To the extent that this factor influences rulemaking
decisions, the disparate impact factor is not an important consideration for
rulemakers in the area of debt allocation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The topic of debt allocation in divorce proceedings is of great importance
to many divorcing couples. The rules of law in this area in many common law
property jurisdictions are not as well-articulated as the corresponding rules
governing asset distribution. Furthermore, the (largely judicial) rules that have
been formulated often reflect a reluctance to establish judicial authority to
reallocate responsibility for the repayment of debts of the marriage. No clear

' Studies regarding the patterns of debt creation in long-term relationships shed additional light on
this analysis of the gender impact of debt allocation rules. These studies reveal a greater
willingness on the part of women to assume formal responsibility in ongoing relationships for debts
that primarily benefit their partners. See, e.g., Miranda Kaye, Equity's Treatment of Sexually
TransmittedDebt, 5 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 35 (1997).
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explanation has been offered for this reluctance to include liabilities as fully as
assets within the conceptual framework of the economic partnership of marriage
at the time of dissolution.
This Article summarized the existing rules that govern equitable
distribution of debts at divorce in the common law property states. The recently
promulgated Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution provides a useful
roadmap for this purpose, as its treatment of the topic is comprehensive.
The Article also speculated about the reasons for withholding full
recognition of debts in equitable distribution law. The reasons identified relate to
the symbolic and practical impact of assigning responsibility for debts (as
opposed to the value of assets) from one person to another at the time of marriage
dissolution.
Finally, the Article analyzed the current state statutes and case law and
the provisions of the Principles by reference to the general goals of equitable
distribution law in the common law property states, relating to a fair winding
down of the spouses' economic affairs at the end of marriage. The conclusion
was reached that certain restrictive debt allocation rules, such as the joint purpose
doctrine and rules excluding student loans from distribution in all cases, are
inconsistent with the basic equitable goals in this area of law.
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